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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Petitioner, Mr. Jackson, filed this petition for review of 
the Industrial Commission's November 3, 1992, Order affirming the 
Administrative Law Judge's July 28, 1992, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, both of which orders denied 
Mr. Jackson's application for permanent total disability benefits. 
Respondents Kaiser Steel Corporation ("Kaiser") and Uninsured 
Employer's Fund ("UEF"),1 (collectively referred to herein as 
"Respondents") agree with the statutory bases for jurisdiction 
cited in Mr. Jackson's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Respondents agree with Mr. Jackson's statement that this 
appeal presents only one issue, namely whether his 1972 industrial 
accident caused him to be permanently totally disabled. He asks, 
in essence, that the Court of Appeals re-weigh the evidence already 
considered by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and the 
Industrial Commission ("Commission"). 
Contrary to Mr. Jackson's contention (Brief, p. 1), medical 
causation is a factual question. Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991). Accordingly, the standard of 
appellate review to be applied is whether the Commission's findings 
are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
The Uninsured Employers' Fund appears in the interest of 
the bankrupt Kaiser Steel Corporation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-107. 
whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g); 
King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 (Utah App. 
March 18, 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
With the possible addition of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act provision cited above, Respondents agree with Mr. 
Jackson that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 is the determinative statute 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a denial of Mr. Jackson's October 25, 
1991 application for permanent total disability compensation based 
on an industrial injury which occurred on April 10, 1972. 
Course of Proceedings 
On March 2, 1973, eleven months after Mr. Jackson's accident, 
he filed an application for hearing alleging entitlement to 
permanent partial disability compensation (Record, p. 5). Based 
upon the report of the Disability Rating Board, the Commission 
found Mr. Jackson entitled to 31.2 weeks of permanent partial 
disability compensation, representing a 10% impairment (Record, 
p. 9). That amount was paid by Kaiser and the case was closed 
(Record, p. 10). 
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Over eighteen years later, on October 25, 1991, Mr. Jackson 
filed an application for permanent total disability benefits as a 
result of his 1972 accident (Record, p. 14). Kaiser and the UEF 
answered the application for hearing and moved to join the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") as a respondent (Record, 
pp. 20-22). A formal hearing was held on June 23, 1992. 
Agency Disposition 
On July 28, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") entered 
detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order concluding 
that Mr. Jackson failed to sustain his burden of establishing that 
his industrial accident was the medical or legal cause of his 
disability. The ALJ therefore denied the claim for permanent total 
disability benefits (Record, pp. 39-43, copy attached as Exhibit 
"B" to Mr. Jackson's brief). 
Mr. Jackson filed a Motion for Review with the Commission 
assigning three points of error (Record, pp. 45-46). The 
Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for Review on 
November 3, 1992 separately addressing each of Mr. Jackson's points 
(Record, pp. 88-92, copy attached as Exhibit "C" to Mr. Jackson's 
brief). The Commission's action is the subject of Mr. Jackson's 
Petition for Review. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Jackson twisted his back in an industrial accident which 
occurred on or about April 10, 1972 (Record, p. 2).2 There was no 
fracture or dislocation (Record, p. 1), and there has been no 
surgery or ongoing treatment of the back. After a period of 
temporary disability, he returned to work at Kaiser for a total of 
about 4£ months (Record, p. 40). 
Mr. Jackson then applied for and received from Kaiser payments 
of temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation 
based on a finding by the Disability Rating Board that the accident 
resulted in a "10% loss of bodily function as a result of 
aggravation of a previously existing degenerate arthrosis of the 
spine" (Record, p. 8). The pre-existing condition was not rated by 
the Panel, though the Panel's rating appears to have been an 
apportionment of Dr. Milligan's finding of a 20% impairment of the 
back, including the preexisting degenerative arthritis (Record, 
pp. 186, 222). Payment was acknowledged by Mr. Jackson on 
April 25, 1973 in a document that also indicated the Applicant's 
intent to release Kaiser from any additional liability (Record, 
p. 10). 
Curiously, Mr. Jackson devotes an entire argument to his 
complaint that the Commission "failed to find that Petitioner 
experienced a compensable industrial accident" (Brief, p. 11). In 
fact, both the ALJ and the Commission acknowledged that a 
compensable accident had occurred (Record, pp. 39, 89). They also 
found, however, that the accident did not cause any disability 
beyond that already rated and paid. 
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About one week after receiving his award of permanent partial 
disability benefits, the Applicant filed for social security 
disability benefits alleging disability due to "Lung problems -
breathing difficulty, ulcer, back trouble, arthritis of spine" 
(Record, p. 223).3 Social Security benefits were awarded. He also 
applied for and received his miner's pension at age 55 and federal 
black lung benefits, an award that is given only for total 
pulmonary disability (Record, p. 41). See 30 U.S.C. § 901. 
Omitted from Mr. Jackson's statement of facts are the numerous 
contradictions between the Applicant's recollection and the medical 
records, and between his statements to Dr. Hess (Record, pp. 180-
187) and his testimony at hearing. These contradictions were noted 
and discussed by the Administrative Law Judge (Record, pp. 40-43) 
and by the Commission (Record, pp. 90-91). 
Among the contradictions are Mr. Jackson's denials of 
breathing problems (Record, p. 41) contrasted with the black lung 
claim and medical reports of moderate to moderately severe chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease in 1974 (Record, p. 204), complaints 
of progressive dyspnea (shortness of breath) beginning in 1973 
(Record, p. 211), and a May 14, 1973 report to Social Security that 
At the time, Mr. Jackson clearly indicated that his 
industrial back strain was not the basis for his Social Security 
total disability claim. Mr. Jackson referenced no accident and, on 
page 2 of his May 4, 1973 Application for Total Disability 
Insurance Benefits, he answered paragraph 7(a) by affirming under 
penalty of law that he had never filed, and never intended to file, 
a claim for workmen's compensation benefits (Record, p. 224). 
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he was "having much trouble breathing" (Record, p. 227). While he 
testified at hearing that he was unable to return to work because 
of back pain (Record, p. 110), he denied any previous history of 
traumatic injury to his back in 1991 (Record, p. 193). Several 
doctors described back pain and other problems associated with 
degenerative arthritis, but none of them attributed the symptoms to 
industrial injury (Record, pp. 193, 203, 211, 222, 227). The more 
recent examination reports offered by Mr. Jackson describe no 
limitation of motion in the back in 1980 (Records, p. 212), and 
improved range of motion since he was rated by the Disability 
Rating Board (Record, p. 186). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission properly found that Mr. Jackson failed to carry 
his affirmative burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his industrial injury was the medical cause of 
his disability. Contrary to his argument, the "liberal policy" 
behind the Worker's Compensation laws is not a substitute for this 
burden of proof. 
There is no affirmative medical evidence that the 1972 
accident rendered the applicant permanent totally disabled. He 
never underwent surgery for his back and obtained no impairment 
rating greater than that already paid by Kaiser. The record 
contains no medical evidence indicating any progression of his back 
symptoms since the Commission's earlier award. 
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The ALJ carefully and comprehensively analyzed this largely 
uncontradicted evidence. Her denial of benefits, and the 
Commission's order affirming that denial, are amply supported by 
substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The ALJ entered her Order denying benefits after reviewing 
Mr. Jackson's testimony and all of the medical evidence (Record, 
pp. 39-43). Based on that review, she found that proof of medical 
and legal causation was lacking. Mr. Jackson then filed a Motion 
for Review with the Commission. The Commission carefully and 
comprehensively reviewed the evidence. It found adequate support 
for the ALJ's finding that the recent medical report submitted by 
Mr. Jackson documented that his back impairment is lower now than 
in 19734 and, noting no conflict in the evidence relating to 
medical causation, found that Mr. Jackson had failed to satisfy his 
burden of proof (Record, p. 88-92). 
Mr. Jackson then took this appeal, acknowledging that 
causation is the only substantial issue presented by this appeal 
Mr. Jackson complains about the Commission's "clear 
misreading" of Dr. Hess's report (Brief, p. 10). It is difficult 
to understand this argument. Dr. Hess's report, which was offered 
by Mr. Jackson, clearly states that the amount of impairment 
attributable to the industrial accident had decreased from 10% (20% 
overall) to 6% (12% overall), and that he has a better range of 
motion now than when previously rated (Record, p. 186). 
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(Brief, p. 1). He incorrectly argues, however, that the standard 
of review for such a reweighing of evidence is the "correction of 
error" standard. In fact, the appropriate standard is whether the 
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Merriam v. Board 
of Review, 812 P.2d at 450. 
To excuse his lack of proof, Mr. Jackson argues that the 
"liberal construction" properly accorded the workers' compensation 
laws supplants his burden of establishing entitlement to benefits 
by a preponderance of the evidence and effectively establishes a 
general presumption of entitlement to benefits (Brief, pp. 5-8). 
His only other argument of substance is that the Commission erred 
in failing to apply the "odd lot" doctrine to this case (Brief, pp. 
13-17). Neither argument succeeds for the reasons that follow. 
A. Mr. Jackson has been Fully Compensated for his Back Injury. 
There is no dispute that the rating given for the Applicant's 
back injury was accepted by Kaiser and fully paid. All temporary 
total compensation, permanent partial compensation, and medical 
expenses attributable to that injury were paid by Kaiser and 
acknowledged by the Applicant. The Applicant then sought and 
received total disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration and the Department of Labor. In both instances he 
received awards for a total disability that was not predicated on 
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his 1972 back injury (for which partial impairment he had already 
been compensated).5 
In describing the purpose of the workers' compensation law, 
the Utah Supreme Court has noted that temporary total disability 
and permanent partial disability: 
. . . are two parts of an integrated effort to 
compensate employees for wage losses suffered 
by reason of industrial injuries. As such, 
they should be viewed and applied as a whole, 
not in isolation. So viewed and applied, they 
should not require an employer to compensate 
an employee for wage losses for which the 
employer has already compensated him or her. 
Similarly, we have held in Paoli v. Cottonwood 
Hospital, Utah 656 P.2d 420, 421 (1982) and 
David v. Industrial Commission, Utah 649 P.2d 
82 (1982), that the closely related second 
injury fund was not intended to compensate an 
employee again for permanent impairment for 
which he or she has already been compensated. 
Hudson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 662 P.2d 29, 30-31 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, the Applicant has already been fully 
compensated by Kaiser for the only impairment attributed to the 
1972 industrial industry. The Applicant is receiving compensation 
from the Social Security Administration and the Department of Labor 
for the wage loss occasioned by other total disabilities, and the 
Mr. Jackson correctly notes that the Social Security 
award was premised upon his general back condition, as well as his 
pulmonary complaints (Brief, p. 8). Contrary to his statement that 
the back condition was related to his industrial accident, his 
application indicates that pulmonary complaints were his primary 
problem and it affirmatively disclaims an industrial disability. 
See n. 3, supra. The contemporaneous and subsequent medical 
reports are consistent with Mr. Jackson's original Social Security 
filings and inconsistent with his new attempt to implicate the 
industrial accident. 
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Utah Workers' Compensation law is not intended to provide him a 
double recovery. This case is quite similar in this respect to 
Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). 
In that case, a worker sustained a nine percent impairment due to 
industrial causes against a backdrop of a one hundred percent 
impairment due to a previously asymptomatic arthritic condition. 
In light of the fact that the applicant had a total disability due 
to other causes, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to 
support the Commission's denial of permanent total disability 
benefits arising out of the industrial accident. 
In the present case, the purposes of workers' compensation are 
amply satisfied by the compensation received for other 
disabilities, and the ALJ appropriately denied Mr. Jackson's 
application for additional compensation. 
B. The Commission Applied the Correct Burden of Proof. 
The ALJ found that Mr. Jackson failed to sustain his burden of 
establishing medical causation (Record, pp. 42-43). In denying 
Mr. Jackson's Motion for Review, the Commission found that ALJ had 
properly required proof of causation by preponderance of the 
evidence (Record, p. 89). The findings of both the ALJ and the 
Commission are appropriate and should be affirmed. 
The Utah courts have consistently required proof of a causal 
connection between the injury and the employment. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986). In Allen, the 
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Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for causation. In order to 
identify compensable injuries, consideration must first be given to 
the legal cause of the injury and then to its medical cause, which 
is to prove that "the disability is medically the result of an 
exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." 
Id. at 27. Proof of medical causation is required, according to 
the Court, to prevent the employer from becoming "a general insurer 
of his employees." Thus, it remains the claimant's burden to show 
that "the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the event 
the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation 
should be denied." Id. at 27. 
The Allen holding was followed by this Court in the case of 
Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 
1988). In Large, a truck driver suffered a lower back injury while 
applying for a job. Much like the present case, he received an 
initial award of temporary total disability benefits which was not 
appealed. Some time later, he filed an application alleging 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits because 5% of 
his impairment was due to the 1985 accident. This Court rehearsed 
the legal/medical causes tests under Allen and noted that the 
standard of proof for causation is that of a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. at 956. In light of the applicant's history of 
prior back problems, including surgeries, the court found 
substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the 
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1985 injury with its 5% additional impairment was not the medical 
cause of permanent total disability. Id. at 957. These standards 
were expressly followed by both the ALJ and the Commission in the 
present case. 
Mr. Jackson makes two arguments to suggest that the Commission 
should have applied a different burden of proof. He first argues 
that the "liberal construction" required of the Worker's 
Compensation Act is somehow a substitute for his burden of proof. 
Then, he argues that the burden of proof is not his, but rather 
that it rests with the employer to find a line of employment that 
the employee can do. Both arguments fail. 
Mr. Jackson argues that all doubts, no matter how remote or 
inconsequential, must be resolved in favor of an award of 
compensation and that it is error if the judge's "liberal 
construction" is not obvious from the face of the order (Brief, 
pp. 5-7). While the well-recognized beneficial policies of the 
Worker's Compensation Act are acknowledged by the Respondents, the 
argument that even the slightest factual uncertainty requires an 
award of benefits greatly distorts the policy of the law. His 
argument, if adopted, would effectively result in a presumption of 
entitlement to benefits in all cases. Employers would always have 
the burden of rebutting the presumption. Such a presumption has 
never been a part of Utah Workers' Compensation law. 
As noted above, the Utah courts have held that the burden 
remains with the applicant to establish his entitlement to benefits 
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by a preponderance of the evidence. Benefits are to be awarded 
based upon evidence, not speculation. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission/ 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985)/ a case cited by 
Mr. Jackson/ Chief Justice Hall observed: 
"The acknowledged purpose of the Worker's 
Compensation Act is to compensate for the 
incapacities attributable to industrial 
injuries. However, it is not the purpose of 
the Act to provide a general health insurance 
plan covering and providing for compensation 
for any and all preexisting incapacities an 
employee may suffer from, and this Court has 
never so indicated." 
709 P.2d at 1172 (Hall, J., dissenting, emphasis by the Court, 
citation omitted). 
Mr. Jackson's theory that this policy requires an award of 
benefits regardless of how the evidence preponderates would 
effectively remove the element of proof and make of the Worker's 
Compensation program a general health insurance plan. Even the 
most "liberal" construction of the law cannot require this result. 
Rather, those cases cited by Mr. Jackson must be read to apply to 
substantial doubts raised by equally probative but contradictory 
evidence. Even in such cases/ care must be taken not to ignore the 
requirements that the evidence preponderate in the applicant's 
favor before an award of benefits is made. 
Caution must also be exercised in applying a "liberal 
construction" to make sure that the rights of all parties are 
safeguarded, not just those of the injured worker. The United 
States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Longshoremen's and 
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Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"), has discussed the 
balance struck in Workers' Compensation legislation: 
Implicit in [respondents'] argument, however, 
is the assumption that the sole purpose of the 
Act was to provide disabled workers with a 
complete remedy for their industrial injuries. 
The inaccuracy of this implicit assumption 
undercuts the validity of respondents' 
argument. 
The LHWCA, like other workmen's 
compensation legislation, is indeed remedial 
in that it was intended to provide a certain 
recovery for employees who are injured on the 
job. It imposes liability without fault and 
precludes the assertion of various common-law 
defenses that had frequently resulted in the 
denial of any recovery for disabled laborers. 
While providing employees with the benefit of 
a more certain recovery for work-related 
harms, statutes of this kind to not purport to 
provide complete compensation for the wage 
earner's economic loss. . . . [L]ike most 
workmen's compensation legislation, the LHWCA 
represents a compromise between the competing 
interests of disabled laborers and their 
employers. 
Potomac Electric Power Company v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 
282-283 (1980). The Utah Workers' Compensation Act also reflects 
such a compromise. 
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge did view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Jackson (Record, 
p. 42). She expressly analyzed the evidence on that basis and 
still found the required proof of causation lacking. 
Similarly, the applicant's reliance on Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (1984), is misplaced. In Marshall, the 
Supreme Court formally adopted the "odd lot" doctrine, under which 
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the burden shifts to the employer to show that regular work is 
available, but only after the employee has demonstrated that his 
work-related impairment prevents him from performing his former 
work and that he cannot be rehabilitated. Id. at 212-213; Ortiz v. 
Industrial Commission/ 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App. 1989). 
The "odd lot" doctrine establishes no "presumption of 
permanent and total disability," contrary to Mr. Jackson's argument 
(Brief, p. 14). Nor does Marshall excuse an applicant's failure to 
prove that his disability is work-related. Implicit in the Court's 
adoption of the "odd lot" doctrine is the requirement that an 
application for hearing will be filed and documented in a timely 
fashion so that the questions of rehabilitation and available work 
can be addressed while the evidence is fresh and the applicant is 
motivated and of employment age. Otherwise, the sensible burden-
shifting mechanism of the "odd lot" doctrine becomes so speculative 
and hypothetical that it makes no sense. 
In the present case, as demonstrated herein, Mr. Jackson did 
not demonstrate that his disability was caused by his industrial 
accident. Moreover, his 18-year delay in claiming permanent total 
disability benefits would work to the extreme prejudice of 
Respondents, should the "odd lot" doctrine be applied. At least 
where the delay is responsibility of the applicant for benefits, 
and was not contributed to in any meaningful way by the 
Respondents, any shifting of the burden of proof would be grossly 
prejudicial and unfair to Respondents. 
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C. Mr. Jackson is not Entitled to Additional Compensation. 
It is important to note that the party challenging the 
findings of the administrative agency has the burden to marshal all 
of the evidence showing that, "despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Where he 
complains about conclusions drawn from hearing testimony, he must 
also provide a transcript. King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 34. Here, Mr. Jackson has provided conclusory 
arguments instead of marshalling the evidence and, while invoking 
his own hearing testimony, did not provide a transcript. 
Utah law also clearly places with the Applicant the burden of 
establishing both legal causation and medical causation. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Since the 
Applicant has a preexisting condition, he has to prove an unusual 
or extraordinary exertion to establish legal causation, and he must 
demonstrate medically that the industrial injury resulted in the 
disability of which he now complains. Allen, 729 P.2d at 26, 27. 
The ALJ found that the Applicant did not meet either prong of his 
causation burden (Record, p. 43.) 
6
 Mr. Jackson also provided no argument or factual basis 
for a modification of his prior permanent partial disability award 
pursuant to the Commission's continuing jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-78. Nor did he demonstrate any significant change 
or new development in the injury since the prior award that would 
justify such action. See Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 
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The Applicant argues that an ALJ must always resolve all 
conflicts in favor of an Applicant, and suggests that the 
Commission's rationale for denying benefits, "is nothing more than 
a ruse to get out of paying benefits" (Brief, p. 10). The 
Applicant is wrong. In the first instance, not all questions, 
however farfetched, must be resolved in favor of the claim. 
Rather, that liberal policy applies only to questions of statutory 
construction and to those rare situations where the evidence on 
both sides is equally probative. Moreover, there is no basis in 
this record to impugn the motives of the Commission. The 
Commission does not pay the benefits and has no motive to resort to 
a "ruse" to avoid them. 
The Applicant's argument is self-defeating and often 
circuitous. He argues that the ALJ improperly relied upon 
Dr. Hess' pulmonary assessment because of the 20-year gap between 
the injury and the evaluation (Brief, pp. 8-9); elsewhere, he 
argues the efficacy of Dr. Hess' 1992 orthopedic assessment (Brief, 
p. 10). He argues that Dr. Lawson's 1980 assessment of pulmonary 
problems should be discounted (Brief, p. 16) but he ignores 
Dr. Lawson's 1974 pulmonary assessment (Record, p. 204). He freely 
cites doctors' reports alluding to back problems (Brief, pp. 7, 15-
16) but he refuses to accept the weight accorded by the ALJ to the 
(footnote continued) 
121 (Utah 1978). Where there has been no development that would 
justify modification of the prior award, there is no logical 
justification for the Commission to entertain entry of a new one. 
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fact that Drs. Lawson and Lamb attributed the back complaints to 
degenerative arthritis without mentioning an industrial cause 
(Brief, pp. 7-8, 16). 
Mr. Jackson argues that "the inability of an injured worker to 
locate and obtain medical records over 20 years old should 
certainly not be construed against an otherwise perfectly valid 
claim . . ." (Brief, pp. 9-10). For the reasons noted above, 
unless an applicant produces sufficient evidence to meet his burden 
of proof, his is not a perfectly valid claim. Mr. Jackson, 
explained his delay in filing by stating he "just didn't get around 
to it" (Record, p. 91). In civil litigation, such delays will 
completely bar a claim on the basis of laches and estoppel; even 
under the comparatively relaxed procedural rules applicable to 
workers1 compensation, the prejudice due to such delays must be 
charged to the applicant and not the employer. 
Mr. Jackson also attempts to dismiss the pulmonary findings 
because he worked with his lung condition "for 34 years" (Brief, 
p. 9). That argument has never defeated claims of total 
disability, which can be masked by a motivated worker. See, Norton 
v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). His attempt 
also fails because there is persuasive evidence of total pulmonary 
disability early in the record: the Applicant admits that he 
applied for and has been receiving federal black lung total 
disability benefits since 1973. These Defendants would not suggest 
that the Applicant perjured himself to the Department of Labor and 
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has since defrauded it by accepting those benefits on a monthly 
basis. Rather, it appears much more likely, as the ALJ implicitly 
found, that his actions were well-motivated at that time based upon 
his symptoms and the medical advice he had received. 
Now, nearly 20 years later and in another benefit setting, his 
memory is conveniently at odds with his prior conduct. In the most 
recent medical report, Dr. Hess found that Mr. Jackson's most 
obvious physical limitation was "marked shortness of breath." In 
that report, Dr. Hess noted the Mr. Jackson's complaint that he 
could not even walk one-quarter of a block and Dr. Hess termed his 
shortness of breath the "prime problem" (Record, pp. 180, 185). 
These are precisely the kinds of conflicts Administrative Law 
Judges are supposed to weigh and resolve. The Judge appropriately 
found that his testimony was "not credible" when viewed in light of 
the applications for black lung disability and Social Security 
benefits filed after he stopped working. This, coupled with 
several other "inconsistencies" in his testimony, undermined his 
claim (Record, pp. 43-44). 
Thus, nothing in the record requires a finding that the 1972 
industrial injury caused or in any significant way contributed to 
a condition of permanent total disability. As this Court has 
noted, "if a claimant cannot demonstrate a medical causal 
connection, compensation should be denied." Merriam v. Board of 
Review, 812 P.2d at 450 (citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
The orders of the ALJ and the Commission applied proper legal 
standards and their findings are amply supported by the medical 
evidence in the record. That evidence demonstrates Mr. Jackson 
sustained an industrial accident in 1972 for which he was fully 
compensated. Separately, his pulmonary condition, perhaps combined 
with his remaining back problem, gave rise to a totally disabling 
condition for which he contemporaneously applied and then received 
two separate awards of total disability benefits. All of his 
impairments have thus been compensated and his wage loss has been 
more than replaced. 
The Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1993. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW, P.C. 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation 
and the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
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